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an Albanian state in 1912. When the existence of such evidence undermines or contradicts
a nationalist agenda, Blumi explains that interested parties can merely airbrush the photo to
better serve the desired end (as depicted on the book’s cover).
The bulk of the work is a close study of the Albanians. Starting with Tepedelenli Ali
Pasha of Yanya (Janina), Blumi’s analysis takes the local—whether local administration or
local loyalties—as its frame of reference. With this focus, the author is able to show the
uniqueness of the various people generally placed under the Albanian umbrella as well as the
absence of unity among these diverse communities. From the Toske¨ effendiyya who distanced
themselves from their “uncivilized” Gege¨ cousins to the Bektashi polemics against Sunnis,
identities and loyalties among the Albanians were local. Throughout the 19th and early 20th
centuries, Albanian leaders, regardless of their self-identification, looked to benefit their local
regions, rather than the Albanians at large. This was demonstrated by the Tanzimat-era actions
of the well-placed Toske¨ elite in Istanbul, a group that successfully appealed to the Porte for
funding and modernization projects for their hometowns even as they ignored the needs of
neighboring communities. These actions also underscored the Toske¨ elite’s attempt to tie the
local to the imperial, creating Ottoman Toske¨ or Ottoman Gege¨, rather than Albanians or even
Ottoman Albanians.
Blumi provides biographical sketches of figures who hold prominent places in the pantheon
of Albanian nationalist heroes, further revealing the complexity of self-identification during
the late Ottoman period. Pashko Vasa, the Frashe¨ri brothers, Isa Boletini, and Ismail Qemali,
among others, all identified themselves in ways that do not conform to the later ethnonational
identity of the Albanian nation-state. A key to all of their identities was that they considered
themselves Ottoman. It was impossible to separate being Albanian from being Ottoman. This
notion is also true for elites from elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, regardless of ethnicity
or religion.
One way in which this Ottoman connection was solidified was through the incorporation of
provincial subjects into the Ottoman bureaucracy, as illustrated in Chapter 5, on educational
reform. The Porte struggled for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries to secure greater
attachment of provincial elites by making it advantageous for them to align themselves with
the state. One of the key means by which the Ottomans sought to achieve this goal at the
end of the 19th century was through the expanding educational system. The establishment
of state schools brought significant funding opportunities as well as prestigious titles to the
provinces, allowing local elites to gain political and economic leverage in their region at the
expense of rivals.
Blumi has produced a valuable study of the western Balkans during the late Ottoman
period, challenging others to examine the interaction of local and imperial identities elsewhere
in the empire. This work is essential reading for anyone interested in this period and in the
establishment of ethnonational Ottoman successor states.
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The prevailing narrative that the foundations of Turkey’s “Kemalist” foreign policy were
established on the principles of peace and noninterventionism has been challenged in the
last decade by a new wave of international relations scholars. Umut Uzer’s Identity and
Turkish Foreign Policy is a revisionist contribution to this debate, focusing on the influence
of nationalism on Turkey’s foreign affairs and, more specifically, the ways in which Turkey’s
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outlook toward external Turks has impacted its foreign policy. Uzer questions whether Turkish
foreign policy has lived up to the Kemalist motto “peace at home, peace abroad,” arguing that
the Turkish Republic’s traditional foreign policy discourse and narrative has been inconsistent
with some of its actual policy positions.
According to Uzer, Turks living outside Turkey have always been a dormant consideration
for Kemalist foreign policy, one that has motivated Turkey to intervene politically and through
the use of force in foreign crises. The extent to which policymakers could pursue a policy
of protection/involvement in relation to the status and political conditions of these “outside
Turks” has been constrained by external factors, such as Turkey’s alliance commitments (e.g.,
to NATO) and the military balance between Turkey and the host countries of outside Turks.
Where such external factors have been minimal, the book argues, Turkey has followed an
interventionist policy structured upon a dual political–military pressuring strategy. To develop
this argument, the book focuses on three case studies: the annexation of Hatay province in
1939, the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the emergence of a new Turkic policy agenda
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The book begins with a discussion of how best to situate Kemalist foreign policy within the
literature on state identity, foreign policy, and the impact of nationalism on official decision
making. The author’s first major argument is that realism has always been the primary lens
through which Kemalism viewed the international system, and that ideas and identity have
served less to drive policy than to legitimize it. In other words, he asserts that Kemalism
emerged as a calculating and rational ideology during the politically fragile reform period of
1925–38. The Kemalist state’s emphasis on noninterventionism was less a matter of principle
than a defensive stance that sought to eliminate any justification for outside powers to intervene
in Turkey’s affairs.
Uzer’s second chapter looks at the development of different strands of Turkish national-
ism and how each one influenced the making of foreign policy. The author identifies three
distinct types of Turkish nationalism: the territorially defensive “Kemalist nationalism”; the
ethnic-expansionist “Nihal Atsız nationalism”; and the Islamic-conservative “Turkish-Islamic
synthesis” that emerged in the late 1970s. Uzer provides an account of how these different na-
tionalisms shaped competing understandings of foreign policy, specifically in relation to Turks
living outside Turkey. Kemalist nationalism has been “selectively involved” in the condition
of outside Turks, “based on domestic and international variables”; Atsız’s ethnonationalism
pursued an expansionist and irredentist Pan-Turkism; and Islamist-conservative nationalism
has been responsive to the protection of Turks in other countries as a foreign-policy issue
only if it can be framed through the intersection of Turkish and Islamic identities (p. 53).
Chapter 3 is a broad exploration of how these different nationalist conceptions have affected
the conduct of Turkish foreign affairs, offering an overview of key events, main actors, and
policy priorities and providing a framework for understanding the conditions that drive Turkish
involvement in foreign affairs. For example, the suppression of Turks abroad has typically
triggered the involvement of Turkey only when the major powers were reluctant to intervene
on behalf of the outside Turks and settle the dispute themselves and when the target state had
little or no external support capable of countering Turkey’s involvement (p. 86).
Turkey’s first departure from a noninterventionist foreign policy occurred over the question
of Hatay, the subject of Chapter 4. A region that came under French Mandate rule after the
defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Hatay (Alexandretta) was annexed by Turkey
in 1939; according to Uzer, the annexation was driven by defensive Kemalist nationalism’s
dormant grudge over lost Ottoman territories. Chapter 5 looks at the case of Cyprus and
at how strategic or realpolitik considerations weighed as heavily as identity concerns on the
minds of Turkish foreign policy officials. Tracing the parallel development of Greek Enosis
and Turkish nationalist ideologies in Cyprus, this chapter explores Turkey’s “discovery” of
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the Turkish Cypriots from the 1950s onward, sometimes referring to it as the “second Hatay
question” (p. 117). Illustrating the point made in Chapter 3, the military balance in relation to
Cyprus (similar to Hatay) was a main reason that Turkish policymakers were more enthusiastic
about intervention on behalf of “outside Turks” than they were in Russia or Iran.
The sixth chapter looks at the expansion of Turkey’s ethnonational awareness in the post-
Cold War period, with its “discovery” of the newly emerging Central Asian Turkic republics,
focusing especially on the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia as a
growing Turkish foreign policy priority. Particularly interesting are the author’s astute compar-
isons in this chapter between Enver Pas¸a, who diverted a large contingency from the Ottoman
army during World War I to unite all Turkic people of Central Asia into a single Turkish
empire, and Turgut ¨Ozal, the Turkish president from 1989 to 1993 who extended Turkey’s
influence into the post-Soviet Turkic republics. While Enver had more grandiose plans to
unite all Turks (along with a parallel aim of reaching British India during World War I so
as to disrupt British access to its most prized colony), ¨Ozal’s outreach to Central Asia is
framed by Uzer as a more pragmatic policy (merged with elements of ethnic-expansionist
nationalism, without incorporating militarist or racist elements), driven by Turkey’s interest in
the post-Soviet Eurasian energy domain, especially natural gas resources. ¨Ozal is not known
as a follower of the traditional “Kemalist foreign policy”; his maximalist stance in post-Soviet
Turkic republics is a very “Enverian” approach that may place him closer to Nihal Atsız’s
version of Turkish nationalism, but he has never been a Turkish supremacist. His view rather
emphasizes Turkey’s ethnolinguistic ties to Central Asia in establishing a political unity, a
perspective that is shared by Enver Pasha and Nihal Atsız. Uzer also provides an interesting
figure, titled “The Ladder of Involvement,” which diagrams the steps through which Turkey
has sought to extend its influence, from “financial support” to “declaration of support” to
“covert operations” and finally to military intervention and annexation in the cases of Hatay
and Cyprus (p. 181).
Uzer’s book is a well-written example of revisionist historiography on Turkish foreign
policy. Although the case studies of Hatay, Cyprus, and Nagorno–Karabagh illustrate his
argument well, one wonders whether these three examples are part of a long-term pattern or
outliers to the general Kemalist approach. Uzer argues that nationalist ideology in Turkish
foreign policy was limited by power dynamics, such as military balance and alliance patterns,
but it is unclear whether this oscillation between realpolitik and ideology is unique to the
case of Turkey and Kemalism in the period discussed. Although questioning the “peaceful”
credentials of Kemalism in foreign policy is not new in the literature, the book offers three
important case studies that give critical substance to an otherwise undercontextualized revi-
sionist line. It is the first study of its kind to approach these three cases in a comparative
fashion, providing an explanation of how different nationalist ideologies and the narrative of
“external Turks” have influenced Turkish foreign policy.
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There exists a rapidly growing body of scholarship on the Kurdish movement in Turkey,
and the author who ventures to add another book to this corpus is well advised to make
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